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REMEMBERING HOW TO DO EQUALITY
Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel∗

Decades ago, equal protection law helped bring about great transformations
in the status of African Americans, women, and other subordinated groups.
Today, constitutional equality doctrine is mostly employed by a conservative
judiciary to preserve the status quo. To restore a progressive constitutional
vision, we must understand how equality law was hijacked in the first place.
And we must recall the forgotten doctrinal tools courts and legislatures
employed to vindicate equality norms in the civil rights era. Refreshing our
collective memory will help us imagine the shape of the next reconstruction.

.
I. REDEMPTIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Reconstruction-era Amendments were aptly named—they were truly
reconstructive. Their framers sought to make equal citizens of newly freed
slaves. The great purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to “to put the
citizens of the several States on an equality with each other as to all
fundamental rights” and to “abolish[] all class legislation in the States and do[]
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
1
applicable to another.” The Amendment’s framers believed that all members
of the political community were entitled to equal freedom, that law should not
be used to create or maintain social caste, and it should not single out groups
for special burdens or benefits unrelated to important public purposes—the
prohibition on so-called “class legislation.” Congress viewed itself as the first
line of defense for these constitutional values. In section 5, Congress gave
itself not only the power but also the responsibility to protect and enforce the
Amendment’s guarantees of equal citizenship.
The Fourteenth Amendment grew out of generations of abolitionist
criticism of the founders’ Constitution for its failure fully to guarantee basic
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rights and equality for all members of the political community. The
Amendment was an act of redemptive constitutionalism—it claimed to fulfill
the greater purposes of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
The same language that made former slaves full citizens still demands equal
freedom for all, offering language of general applicability that each inheriting
generation must decide how to honor.
Americans making new claims on the Fourteenth Amendment reenact its
origins. They invoke the Amendment’s text—as well as the Declaration—to
dramatize the gap between our ideals and our practices. Sometimes judges
have helped to implement the Amendment’s great promises; sometimes they
have limited them and distorted them. But each generation has challenged and
built on previous interpretations, preserving some and rejecting others, with the
goal of realizing equal freedom in their own time.
The post-ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment is rich with
examples of redemptive constitutionalism. Women in the abolitionist
movement who worked for ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in turn
claimed equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Court
rejected their claims, they gained the right to vote through the Nineteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1920, and, fifty years later, guarantees of equality
through new interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Popular
mobilizations led the New Deal Court to reject the anti-egalitarian vision of
2
liberty expressed in Lochner v. New York; a long struggle for black civil rights
led the Court to reject its previous apology for racial inequality in Plessy v.
3
4
Ferguson in Brown v. Board of Education. In our own day Lawrence v.
5
Texas overturned the Court’s pinched vision of human freedom in Bowers v.
6
Hardwick . Over time, certain interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
have come to symbolize great wrongs of American public life that we have
decisively rejected. Cases like Plessy function as negative precedents. Their
repudiation expresses our contemporary ideals of justice. They symbolize the
country’s continuing task of constitutional redemption.
As it was in the past, so it is in the present. After years of political
retrenchment, the Court’s equality doctrines now betray the Fourteenth
Amendment’s great promises. Increasingly, equality doctrine today does not
guarantee equal liberty as it can and as it should; rather it promotes the liberty
of the privileged. Increasingly equality doctrine does not prevent law from
maintaining social caste; it prevents governments from remedying and
dismantling caste. Increasingly equality doctrine does not protect subordinated
groups from class legislation; it fetishizes classifications and stimulates class
resentments.
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II. WHAT WENT WRONG?
Less than fifteen years after Brown, Americans began electing presidents
who campaigned against the Warren Court and the Civil Rights Revolution.
These presidents appointed Justices who changed the direction of equal
protection law, claiming to condemn discrimination while defining it in
increasingly narrow terms.
In the 1970s, a newly constituted Court began to define discrimination as a
problem of forbidden classifications in laws, not social subordination through
law. It divided the world into laws with forbidden classifications, which courts
would closely scrutinize, and laws without forbidden classifications, where no
constitutional problems of equality existed and legislatures had complete
discretion. The Court ruled that “equal protection” barred state action that
expressly classified on basis of race, but allowed facially neutral laws that
7
predictably burdened minorities and maintained social stratification. The
Court made an exception for laws enacted with a purpose to discriminate, but
defined purpose extremely narrowly, requiring a showing close to deliberate
8
malice. Meanwhile the Court held that express classifications designed to help
subordinated groups were as constitutionally suspect as those designed to keep
them down.
At the dawn of the twenty first century, then, equal protection doctrine
focuses on deliberate classification by the state as the main cause of inequality
in American society, and strict scrutiny by judges as the main remedy. This
framework entrenches inequality in at least four important ways.
First, the law defines inequality underinclusively, either as group
classification or thinly concealed malice. But not all state action that
subordinates employs group based classifications, and not all inequality is
produced by evil minds. Social stratification by gender and race has been
sustained by many different kinds of public and private action. Bias in
decisionmaking often plays a role, but so too do institutional arrangements and
rules that entrench unequal resources and opportunities. The Court’s model is
well designed to strike at Jim Crow laws that no legislatures pass any more—
but it simultaneously legitimates laws whose hidden, unconscious, or structural
bias is not openly expressed. It immunizes structural inequalities that
accumulated over the generations in which the United States openly enforced
race and gender hierarchies.
Second, doctrine’s focus on group classifications defines inequality
overinclusively, because not all such classifications subordinate. The Court
now treats race-based classifications that try to remedy inequalities and break
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down social stratification with the same degree of scrutiny—and judicial
hostility—as classifications that deliberately advantaged dominant groups in
the past. As Justice Stevens has put it, the law professes not to know the
9
difference between a welcome mat and a “No Trespassing” sign.
Third, because the doctrine makes forbidden classifications presumptively
unconstitutional, it ties judges’ hands, making them disinclined to extend
heightened scrutiny to new groups, even groups widely acknowledged to have
suffered invidious treatment. In fact, the Supreme Court has not conferred
suspect status on any group since the 1970s.
Fourth, current doctrine is based on a bifurcated framework of review
that splits authority between legislatures and courts and discourages dialogue
between them. Either legislation is presumptively unconstitutional and the
Court has complete control over what constitutional equality requires; or
legislation bears an almost irrebuttable presumption of democratic legitimacy,
and neither the Court nor the political branches has authority or obligation to
promote the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees. When the state tries to
remedy societal discrimination using race- or gender-conscious means, courts
view this as presumptively illegitimate. On the other hand, when legislatures
adopt facially neutral policies that entrench group inequalities, courts defer to
the political process, and legislatures have no obligation to promote equality
norms.
This all-or-nothing vision is false to the original vision of section 5. These
days Congress is no longer the first line of defense for equality; indeed it has
no obligations at all. And when Congress does use its section 5 powers, the
Court treats these acts of legislative constitutionalism as presumptively
unconstitutional encroachments on the Court’s own interpretive authority-- all
the more so if Congress tries to prohibit forms of discrimination the Court
itself has not deemed suspect. There is little in current doctrine that encourages
dialogue between courts and the political branches about the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment; nor is there much recognition that different branches
of government could bring their distinctive authority and competence to the
great task of vindicating the Constitution’s equality guarantee.

III. THE LOST TOOLS OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
10

By last year’s Parents Involved decision, the Court had come full circle—
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caused stigmatic and emotional harm to minority school children. The Court
did not embrace a general principle of strict scrutiny until it was finally ready
to strike down laws against interracial marriage in the 1960s, and soon
thereafter strict scrutiny began a new life in the 1970s and 1980s as a device to
11
hold affirmative action programs unconstitutional.
Although courts now identify strict scrutiny with the goals and purposes of
the civil rights revolution, other pathways for protecting equality during the
opening decades of the Second Reconstruction were far more important. They
included:
1. Legislative and Executive Constitutionalism. The model of strict
scrutiny assumes that legislatures and executive officials lack the desire, the
obligation and the authority to promote equality values. Their only
responsibility is to refrain from using suspect classifications. Yet, the political
branches took the lead during the Second Reconstruction, just as the original
Reconstruction Congress had intended. Congress prohibited discrimination
through superstatutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. At the same time Congress
promoted equality for the poor through educational funding and through War
on Poverty and Great Society programs like Head Start. In 1972 Congress
applied the 1964 Civil Rights Act to government employers and sent an Equal
Rights Amendment to the states, emphasizing its commitment to abolish sex
discrimination as well as race discrimination. In the executive branch,
administrative agencies implemented the new laws with regulations that
promoted equality, including guidelines for school desegregation, rules to
combat sex discrimination in the workplace, and anti-poverty programs that
promoted local participation by the poor. The Court worked with Congress; it
read the new civil rights statutes broadly to promote egalitarian goals, and it
looked to the President and Congress to secure enforcement of its rulings.
2. Promoting Equality through Protecting Civil Liberties. Dominant groups
rarely give up their status willingly. Laws dismantling status hierarchies cannot
redistribute opportunities to subordinate groups too transparently; they risk
generating backlash, aggravating the very social dynamics they seek to abate.
Indirection is often a friend of change. During the Second Reconstruction,
subordinated groups often made gains through doctrines that promoted fair
procedures and individual liberty for all. The Warren Court’s revolution in
criminal procedure protected racial minorities from police abuse, secured basic
rights of legal representation and limited prosecution tactics that played on
racial prejudice. Free speech doctrines protected the right of the NAACP to
organize and student groups to protest Jim Crow. The rebirth of fundamental
12
13
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14

Roe v. Wade not only protected women’s autonomy but also their equality in
civil society, and particularly benefited poor women.
3. Fundamental Interests and Protection of the Poor. Finally, the Supreme
Court recognized a set of fundamental interests protected by the Equal
Protection Clause that secured access by the poor to key institutions of civil
society. These decisions removed resource-related restrictions on core forms
of civic participation and limited some of the harsher expressions of class (and
15
race and sex) inequality. They improved access to the criminal process,
16
lifted welfare-related burdens on the right to travel, and guaranteed the right
17
to vote without having to pay poll taxes.
The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government worked
together during the civil rights era. Drawing on their different institutional
authority and competence, they promoted equality in many different ways.
They sought to limit unfair treatment on the basis of race and sex. But they
also promoted equal rights for Americans by promoting their individual liberty
and their practical freedom, constraining the use of general laws and
discretionary law enforcement practices that bore harshly on the most
vulnerable members of society.
In short, the Second Reconstruction promoted equality by promoting equal
liberty. Equal liberty should not be confused with either formal liberty or
formal equality. The practical reality of freedom matters as much as its formal
possibility. The Second Reconstruction paid attention to the inequalities of
resources and roles that shaped ordinary people’s daily lives and their
encounters with the law.

IV. PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES
In today’s world, the language of constitutional equality has been hijacked
and co-opted to protect those with privilege from the claims of those who lack
it. How can we restore constitutional equality in the twenty-first century? Here
are a few suggestions:
1. Use liberty to promote equality. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment saw liberty and equality as deeply intertwined. They originally
hoped to secure equality for freed slaves not only through an Equal Protection
Clause but through guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Sometimes securing liberties for all is an effective way of
protecting minorities and unpopular groups from special impositions and
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affirming their equal citizenship. . Gay rights is the most obvious example:
Lawrence v. Texas protects equal citizenship for gays by protecting their
liberty and their dignity. Yet equality values suffuse the Lawrence opinion: the
Court reasoned that same-sex intimacy should be treated with the same respect
the law treats opposite-sex relations.
Liberty models have proved particularly attractive for gay rights because
they don’t require that courts define a protected class. Therefore gays do not
have to understand themselves as part of a single group with a single identity
in order to be treated as equal citizens. Using liberty to help minorities also
avoids the problem—most obvious in affirmative action cases—of appearing
to favor one group over another.
Increasing women’s practical autonomy over their sexual and reproductive
choices plainly promotes sex equality, as the Supreme Court has increasingly
come to recognize. Contraception and abortion rights help women achieve
greater equality in civil society. Giving women more control over the number
and timing of their children, and helping women to have children and raise
them without sacrificing their employment prospects or their family’s
wellbeing is crucial to women’s welfare and status. Once again, liberty and
equality reinforce each other: Equality doctrines protect women’s choices in
life pursuits, while liberty doctrines promote women’s equality in making
those choices.
The Warren Court also pioneered the idea of protecting fundamental rights
and fundamental interests—rights that once granted, must be granted equally.
These rights and interests promote equality along class lines without using
suspect classifications based on poverty or race.
Finally, criminal procedure guarantees and restrictions on state detention
and surveillance demonstrate how protecting liberty also protects equality. It
is no accident that the Warren Court revolutionized criminal procedure while it
promoted black civil rights; it knew that mistreatment of blacks in the criminal
process was a major method of keeping them down. In a post-9/11 world,
where majorities seem only too happy to surrender other people’s rights, we
need civil liberties to limit the harassment of Muslims and immigrants and the
misuse of racial profiling schemes.
2. Decalcify doctrine. Although the Equal Protection Clause is not the only
vehicle for securing equality, it is still a crucial one. It cannot serve its
purposes until we undo some of the problems current doctrine has created.
Courts should look beyond the fetishism of formal classification, which is
neither a necessary nor sufficient marker of laws that threaten equal
citizenship. We need new ways to decide which laws that burden women and
minorities deserve closer scrutiny. One way to do this, borrowed from the law
of employment, jury and voting rights law, is to make more use of rebuttable
presumptions when policies have significant disparate impact, perpetuate
traditional forms of inequality or significantly contribute to social
stratification. Courts need not invalidate these arrangements; they can require
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the political branches to become politically accountable for them by requiring
legislatures to explain why they chose policies that entrench historic forms of
inequality or have strongly inegalitarian effects.
Courts should also allow the political process more latitude in deciding
when asymmetry of treatment in remedial legislation is necessary to dismantle
caste. Even the most determined advocates of colorblindness are usually
willing to accept benign race-conscious motivations for facially race-neutral
methods like Texas’s “10 percent plan” or class-based affirmative action. That
would make little sense if there really was no difference between benign and
invidious motivation. The real issue isn’t colorblindness; it is how the state
allocates the burdens of remedial and integrative programs among beneficiaries
and nonbeneficiaries. Courts should relax scrutiny for race conscious
programs that are genuinely tailored to remedy past discrimination or promote
present integration and that spread and diffuse burdens on members of
dispreferred groups.
Finally, courts should give up the model of bifurcated responsibility for
protecting equality. That means and adopting a suggestion made long ago by
18
Justice Thurgood Marshall—a sliding scale approach to judicial scrutiny.
Even more important, courts should use a variety of doctrinal moves to disturb
existing structures and spur legislatures to act to promote constitutional values
of equality, as described below.
3. Share responsibility for guaranteeing equality. Instead of treating
policies that increase social stratification as fully legitimate, courts could adopt
solutions that make legislatures accept responsibility for their actions and give
them a stake in promoting and enforcing constitutional equality. Courts can be
catalysts, shaking up existing political coalitions and social practices, requiring
legislatures to give reasons and make hard choices when their policies
exacerbate inequality and place disproportionate burdens on minorities or the
poor. Among other things:
(a) Courts can name inequalities produced by existing polices and order the
political branches to respond. They can employ discourse forcing methods
that require the political branches to explain how their policies respond to
specific constitutional values.
(b) Courts can interpret statutes and regulations to avoid entrenching
inequality and require legislatures either to accept the interpretations or
publicly renounce them.
(c) Courts can introduce rebuttable presumptions—already used in jury,
voting, and employment discrimination law—under which disparate impact
triggers a duty to explain and justify policies. For example, courts could order
“equality impact statements,” that would require state actors to focus on and
report on the effects of their policies on social stratification by race, gender,
18
San Antonio Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
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class or other criteria. Without absolving or condemning legislatures, courts
could force the political branches to take the political heat for what they were
doing.
(d) Courts can declare existing policies unconstitutional, explain the
constitutional principles at stake, and let the political branches craft a remedy
that honors those principles. Courts can give the outward boundaries of a
constitutional remedy, state the parameters it will use in reviewing the remedy,
or explain what kinds of reasons and justifications the legislatures must
provide. For example, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court declared
the state’s marriage laws discriminated against gays but instead of creating a
19
judicial right to gay marriage, it asked the legislature to craft a solution. The
legislature responded with the country’s first civil unions bill. State supreme
courts protecting the right to education have also put the burden on state
legislatures to craft workable guarantees of rights to education.
(e) Courts can create safe harbors that give incentives for political branches
to reform their current practices in order to avoid liability. For example, in
sexual harassment law courts have given employers safe harbors for vicarious
liability if they produce mechanisms for preventing harassment and resolving
disputes. Safe harbors change the balance of incentives, giving the political
branches reasons to be proactive in promoting equality values.
The key idea in these strategies of shared responsibility is to make the
practice of equality a more dialogic enterprise between the courts and the
political branches. Criminal law is a good example: Our current system of
strict scrutiny and bifurcated responsibility is ill suited to remedying the
inequalities of race and poverty in our criminal justice system. Courts can’t
oversee the entire criminal justice system, yet the system’s unequal impact on
the poor and racial minorities is everywhere. Indeed in some cases the system
uses racial classifications in suspect descriptions and racial profiling. The
proper response is not to insist, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has, that there
are no constitutional issues of equality at all. That gives law enforcement
officials carte blanche and takes the political branches completely off the hook.
Instead courts should try to push responsibility onto the political branches for
the decisions they make, creating a politics where lawmakers and law
enforcement officials feel pressure to take equality issues into account.
20
Or take welfare policy. In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court upheld a
draconian family size cap on welfare benefits. Justice Stewart, hemmed in by
the bifurcated system of equality law, threw up his hands. He did not want to
treat poverty as a suspect classification, but believed that the alternative,
rational basis, foreclosed doing anything at all. He noted that regulating “the
most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings” was clearly
different from “state regulation of business or industry” upheld during the New
Deal “We recognize the dramatically real factual difference . . . but we can
19
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find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.” Stewart was
disabled by an unworkable doctrinal structure. Yet this is not a case of eitheror. Without making poverty a suspect classification, courts could use statutory
interpretation or rebuttable presumptions to send the problem back to
legislatures. They could require legislatures to explain why their policies do
more good than harm.
4. Take advantage of jurisdictional redundancy. Our federal system of
separated powers gives many different actors an opportunity to declare what
the Constitution means. Equality law can benefit from having courts,
legislatures, and executive officials take responsibility for promoting equality.
Similarly, we should not forget the role that federalism can play. Although the
standard story of the civil rights revolution is that it fought against states’
rights, it’s worth remembering that much of the early progress in black civil
rights came from enlightened state laws and judicial decisions and spread
nationally. Long before the 1964 Civil Rights Act many states already had
passed public accommodation laws, and by the time of Brown the majority of
states had banned de jure segregation either through statute or judicial
decision. Many of the equality issues of the future will be worked out in state
and local governments first. Similarly, decisions of state constitutional courts
often pave the way for later interpretations of the federal Constitution.
Many of the most important tools for protecting equality in the twenty first
century will be dialogic. We are hardly alone in this conclusion. Many other
countries already achieve the similar dialogic effects through very different
constitutional structures, including, most prominently, Canada’s
notwithstanding provision and the United Kingdom’s use of declarations of
incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed,
American constitutionalism has used these dialogic practices for generations
without fully noting them. Our official model of strict scrutiny may be sterile
and useless, but there are other practices in our traditions worth remembering
and bringing to the surface.
Several of the essays in this volume emphasize how legislative and
executive constitutionalism can safeguard social and economic rights like
housing, education, and health care. Courts cannot mandate specific
institutional reforms in these areas, but they can spur them on, shape how they
are constructed, and review them for arbitrariness. The path to greater equality
in the twenty first century will require the cooperation of all the branches of
government. And it will bring us back to a vision of egalitarian liberty that
redeems the promises of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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